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14. ABSTRACT Contractors on the battlefield have become so commonplace that many consider them the “third force”, along with the Active and Reserve forces. Contractors have become part of the DOD force structure, and their use has given the JFC capabilities and flexibility not found in the present military force structure. Yet the DOD has paid insufficient attention to the integration of this large force as a full partner in planning, training and sharing best practices. Because of this JFC now lacks the mechanisms to command and control (C2) contractors, so performing this joint function is difficult at best. In order to provide the JFC with the tools he needs, the DOD should radically transform how it plans and trains with contractors. Partnering with commercial firms can bring much to the table to facilitate the integration and C2 of contractors. This paper examines the challenges faced by the JFC in managing his accompanying contractor force and makes recommendations to fix those problems. It looks at the CONLOG model used by the British military to manage the contractor force, and recommends that the DOD adapts this model and further develop it to suit its needs.					
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Command and Control of the Third Force: Contractors on the Battlefield

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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23 October 2009

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Abstract

Command and Control of the Third Force: Contractors on the Battlefield

Contractors on the battlefield have become so commonplace that many consider them the “third force”, along with the Active and Reserve forces. Contractors have become part of the DOD force structure, and their use has given the JFC capabilities and flexibility not found in the present military force structure. Yet the DOD has paid insufficient attention to the integration of this large force as a full partner in planning, training and sharing best practices. Because of this JFC now lacks the mechanisms to command and control (C2) contractors, so performing this joint function is difficult at best. In order to provide the JFC with the tools he needs, the DOD should radically transform how it plans and trains with contractors.

Partnering with commercial firms can bring much to the table to facilitate the integration and C2 of contractors.

This paper examines the challenges faced by the JFC in managing his accompanying contractor force and makes recommendations to fix those problems.

It looks at the CONLOG model used by the British military to manage the contractor force, and recommends that the DOD adapts this model and further develop it to suit its needs.

INTRODUCTION

Contractors performing support functions during contingencies are a reality for all Military Services, in particular the U.S. Army. A number of factors and events led the military to where it is today relying almost completely on contractors for system support, combat support and combat service support.

Critics of the extensive use of contractors, have used such terms as mercenaries, “merchants of death” and “coalition of the billing”¹ to describe the use of contractors during war.

Yet contractors have for the most part performed exceptionally well in support of US forces in such places as Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and now in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

This paper proposes that outsourcing is the proper way for the DOD to perform logistics support, reconstruction, system support and base camp support. The paper will focus on the appropriateness of using contractors for these tasks. It will also assess what regulatory mechanisms need to be implemented to allow the Joint Force Commander to command and control contractors and provide stewardship and oversight of government resources in his AOR.

“For over a decade, the United States has gradually increased the types and roles for which it contracts private companies in military operations. Congress has generally accepted the concept of using unarmed private contractors to carry out support functions in military operations”.²

Contractors have become an essential part of the theater force structure supporting a JTF, acting as a combat multiplier force. But their employment developed faster than the Joint

¹ Cancian, Mark, “Contractors: The New Element of Military Force Structure,” Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Autumn 2008: 61

² CRS Report for Congress, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and other Issues, Updated July 11, 2007: 1

doctrine and contract regulations at the Federal and DOD levels, leaving COCOM and JTF planners without the appropriate time and tools to optimally plan for the employment of this large provider of combat support and combat service support, which is so important in accomplishing the JTF's mission.

The successful use of contractors in many contingencies is a viable concept in that they provide support in areas that are not optimal for the military services, if they are to concentrate in honing their war fighting skills. The DOD should now focus its attention on how to make the command and control of the contractor force accompanying the JTF easier for the commander. Other goals should include improved oversight of contractor functions, accountability of their personnel, and integration of their functions in the planning process.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

It is important to examine how the Services got to where they are in the use of contractors and to provide an analysis of where the practice got ahead of doctrine, allowing for ad hoc pairings reminiscent to pick up games.³ Although contractors have accompanied and supported American Forces since the Revolutionary War, it wasn't until after the Cold War that the DOD started to outsource many combat support and combat service support functions. The reason, "the Services, especially the Army were structured with an emphasis on combat units at the expense of support units".⁴

Over the years the ratio of contractors to military deployed has gone from a ratio of 1:6 during the earlier conflicts in our history to 1:1 in OEF/OIF. Most of the DOD contractors deployed to OEF/OIF are employed in reconstruction and logistics base support, 164,000 out

³ Rampy, Michael R., "Paradox or Paradigm? Operational Contractor Support", Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, May-June 2005: 73

⁴ Cancian, Contractors: New Element, 61

of 179,600 as of the second quarter of FY 2008.⁵ This logistical contracted support is known as operational contractor support (OCS), and it has become deeply embedded in the way the services support overseas contingencies.

Despite criticism and fears the practice will dilute military skills and that it is more costly than using military members to perform those duties, outsourcing “allows military personnel to focus in their core competencies – what they do best – to successfully accomplish the mission”.⁶ Experts in organizational behavior have concluded “organizational success is determined by excellence in a small number of these core competencies. Because these competencies are so crucial, the organization must maintain a preeminent operational capability in them. Non-core competencies are outsourced”⁷

Few would argue that military members core competencies should include such blue collar functions as carpentry, emptying and cleaning latrines, cleaning and serving in dining facilities, driving trucks or fixing and setting up temporary billeting at base camps.

American civilian contractors, third country nationals (TCN), or host nation employees, who acquired experience and expertise in these fields during multiple deployments can more effectively and efficiently manage these tasks. Traditionally of course these jobs were handled by military personnel, “ but the high cost and relative scarcity of experienced uniformed personnel in the all-volunteer force made use of contractors an attractive option”.⁸

A study performed by the British Ministry of Defense found that “outsourcing can enhance the morale, cohesion, combat effectiveness and ethos of the armed services, these gains accrue on two levels: contractors can relieve military personnel of mundane support

⁵ Cancian, Contractors: New Element, 62

⁶ Rampy, Paradox or Paradigm? 73

⁷ C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, “The Core Competence of a Corporation”, Harvard Business Review (May-June 1990); 79-91, as quoted by Rampy: 74

⁸ Cancian, Contractors: New Element, 63

missions, enabling soldiers to focus on mission critical activities that can improve their quality of life significantly and, ultimately, impact [positively] on training and retention”.⁹

The study goes on to say that on a more fundamental level it has been suggested that the “corporate ethos” of defense contractors themselves leads to close cooperation with the armed services on operational deployments. The contention here is defense contractors tend to recruit ex-military personnel, “predisposed to ways of acting, based on values drawn from their experiences in the military service, and who operate to the same high standards of the armed services, while exhibiting the same moral values which were first instilled in them in the military”.¹⁰

In addition to the benefits mentioned in the British study, contractors provide the DOD and the COCOM with a flexibility military organizations cannot. “The five most important reasons are the industry’s surge capability and speed, force multiplication, specialized skills, ease of use and cost efficiency”.¹¹

Surge capability and speed refers to the ability of the military to increase its capabilities and specialties quickly.¹² It takes the military services months and years to recruit, train, and provide experience to a new soldier. In many cases “some military specialties in greatest demand require years of training, and even once the force has been increased, each new soldier represents an enormous long term investment in the form of training, salaries, and extended benefits”.¹³

⁹ Utley, Matthew, Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2005, 16.

¹⁰ Utley, Contractors Deployed, 16

¹¹ Brooks, Doug and Shevlin, Jim, Reconsidering Battlefield Contractors, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer 2005, 106

¹² Ibid, 106

¹³ Brooks and Shevlin, Reconsidering, 106

By contrast, private firms can quickly recruit personnel with the needed expertise from the global pool of former military personnel to fill short-term contracts with finite costs.

Deployment times for private sector personnel are generally days or weeks, whereas government times are measured in months”.¹⁴

Similarly, the private sector also holds an advantage in providing specialized skills. Our modern forces are the owners of state of the art sophisticated equipment and weapon systems. These systems require highly trained specialists to maintain them, “often it is impractical to train a soldier to maintain this technology, as it is unknown for how long that soldier will remain in the force. By contracting with the manufacturer to provide technical support, the military saves the cost of having to train a new set of technicians every four years, the standard military enlistment period”.¹⁵ In fact Performance Based Logistics, a system adopted by the DOD in 2001, requires that the contractor provide support for the life cycle of the equipment.¹⁶ Equipment such as the Apache helicopter, and the Stryker vehicle deploy to contingencies with a retinue of specialists to perform maintenance and support for these systems.

“Ease of use refers to the capacity of clients to hire, fire and control the behavior of companies they contract. Companies are for profit entities and ultimately can be controlled financially; stop paying them and they go away”.¹⁷

Over time our contract instruments have become more sophisticated as have our contracting officers and now they are able to negotiate contracts that are more comprehensive and

¹⁴ Ibid, 106

¹⁵ Ibid, 106

¹⁶ Latham, William C. Jr., LTC (R), Not My Job: Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army, Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, March-April 2009, 44

¹⁷ Brooks and Shevlin, Reconsidering, 107

flexible enough to deal with different types of contingencies. Still there is work to be done to tailor these contracts to better support the COCOM and JFC.

Finally, contractors are cost effective. “Due to experienced personnel and a small size compared to the DOD, they are usually able to move faster and adapt more quickly than the regular military. Lower overhead means lower costs, and most companies rely on short-term contract employees, well paid but requiring no long term benefit costs”.¹⁸

The Army experience with Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan has been that companies will employ a small nucleus of American managers, and they in turn will hire and train local national (LN) and third country nationals (TCN), thus saving money to the contract because LNs and TCNs cost a lot less than American employees. Many of those LNs and TCNs who supported the US military in Bosnia, are now deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.

As an augmentation force to the JTF, the contractor workforce is absolutely necessary in order to provide sustained support to the deployed forces, and to allow the release of military personnel to perform their core competencies without the burden of mundane tasks.

According to Brooks and Shevlin, “it appears that future conflicts will involve reconstruction and peace and stability operations, contractors seem to be the perfect fit to relieve military forces from these duties”¹⁹, thus allowing them to focus on their training and honing their combat skills.

Despite all the experience acquired by the military in the operations previously mentioned, the joint doctrine has not caught up with the practice. While at the strategic level the military has made significant progress in devising system and OCS contracts, and the contract

¹⁸ Brooks and Shevlin, 107

¹⁹ Ibid, 109

community has developed great partnerships with private companies, the same cannot be said is happening at the operational level. The command and control of the contractor force is a challenge, contingency contracting has developed in fits and starts, and the staffs lack the knowledge and experience to plan for the use of the contractor force, or to effectively manage contracts in contingency areas. “Joint Doctrine for contracting has not been fully developed and, unfortunately, is being conducted in an ad hoc fashion”.²⁰

Because of the many advantages outsourcing provides the DOD, the “use of contractors on the battlefield is no longer an optional or marginal activity”.²¹ Therefore now planners must plan for contractors as part of the US military force structure. Just as there are plans, preparations, and procedures for using reserve forces, the same needs to be done in the case of contractors”.²²

But before the Joint Force Commander’s planners can start planning a transformational effort must take place to change and update Joint doctrine, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in fact a restructuring of the acquisition and contracting community is necessary in order to give the Joint Force Commander the tools to command and control and to exercise stewardship of US government resources.

Command and control (C2) a joint function defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, as encompassing the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC provides vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force.²³

²⁰ Young, David L, “Operational Planning for Contractors on the Battlefield”, (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1998, as quoted by Major Charles G. Chiarotti, in his paper Joint Contractor Logistics Support Doctrine: Ensuring Success on the 21st Century Battlefield, February 2000, 2

²¹ Cancian, Contractors: New Element, 74

²² Ibid, 75

²³ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Incorporating Change 1, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington D.C., 13 February 2008, III-1

“Management of this new force on the battlefield is the issue of command and control or C2, especially in a non-linear asymmetric war zones”.²⁴ In the battlefield now there are two chains of command, the military and the contractors, and the “only link between the two is through the contracting officer who has sole authority over the contractors. „Duties of contractors are established solely by the terms of their contract”.²⁵

At the top of the contractor “chain of command” is the Primary Contracting Officer (PCO), and/or designated representative. “ With multiple contractors under different PCOs, representing a host of US agencies, including the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, the Combatant Commanders have a massive management responsibility and challenge”.²⁶ Not only the Combatant Commander has this challenge but more importantly the JFC. The CJFC is also likely to find that his coalition partners, especially NATO forces, deploy with a significant contractor force, now he and his staff have the additional problem of coordinating the functions of two or more contractor forces operating in the same battle space. This does not mean that the JFC has no control, “he can exercise indirect control of contractor personnel through contract terms and conditions, employer assimilation of command directives into employer-employee agreements, and attachment (with special reporting procedures) into specific military units”.²⁷ The commander can also direct subordinate units to provide administrative, logistical support and reporting responsibility for contractor personnel. Contractors who violate a commander’s directive may be punished with limited access to facilities or revocation of any special status

²⁴ Contractors on the Battlefield, Lexington Institute, February 2007, The United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, NWC 3025, 10

²⁵ IBID, 7

²⁶ IBID, 11

²⁷ Fortner, Joe A. and Jaeckle, Ron, Institutionalizing Contractors on the Battlefield, accessed from <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec98/MS317.htm>

the employee enjoys, or he may even be removed from the area of operations and the employer can suffer some financial penalties depending on their contract.

The control process however is complicated because of the different coordination requirements of the various contractors. The COCOM has a Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracts (PARC). He is the commander's advisor for contracts and is responsible for controlling contractor operations and coordinating their activities, but only for contracts that are awarded and managed by the COCOM. "But external support contractors and system contractors operate under the authority of other PARCs. Coordinating and controlling their activities and executing changes to their contracts are significantly more complicated".²⁸

The conflict in Bosnia is often cited as the occasion where the military first utilized large number of contractors to support operations. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) and subsequently the Implementation Force (IFOR), utilized contractors to run base camps and airfields, at the height of this surge there were over 100 firms providing different types of services to the Army and the Air Force. These contracts ranged from the Kellog, Brown and Root (KBR) Company, under the auspices of the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) for support to smaller contracts to operate morale, welfare, and recreation contracts, communications and sundry other contracts. The US Army Europe PARC managed some of the contracts, but most of the larger logistics and system contracts, including KBR's, were managed by agencies in the United States. This situation remained all the way through the closure of all the bases in Bosnia. An earlier GAO report had the following to say about the planning for integrated contractor support:

Despite significant efforts to effectively manage LOGCAP, U.S. Army, Europe officials' inexperience and lack of understanding of the contract, the contractor's

²⁸ Fortner, Institutionalizing Contractors

capabilities, and program management created problems during deployment and resulted in unnecessary cost.²⁹

Through the contracting life of the Bosnia contingency there was little improvement in managing contracts, and program management, even after the KBR contract became a USAREUR contract. It is easy to see how the C2 problems of the commander are compounded by having to navigate through numerous contracts and agencies to perform his control functions of integrating efforts and allocating resources.

The DOD has not yet done a good job of fixing problems identified in previous and current deployments. The Gansler Commission presented to the Secretary of the Army its findings and recommendations regarding contracting in expeditionary operations. Their assessment found the following major weaknesses: “ Contracting should be a core capability of the Army, but it currently is treated as an operational and institutional side issue”.³⁰ OCS is an area that the DOD has by and large paid little attention to, focusing primarily on the acquisition of materiel and systems. Another finding was “ [there is a] Lack of planning and training for expeditionary contracting and contract management”.³¹ Across the JTF there is little knowledge by the leadership and soldiers of the role of contractors or how to manage or task them. Finally, “[There is] Lack of recognition by (operators) of the impact of contracting and contractors in expeditionary operations (yet approximately 50 [percent] of ‘force’ in Iraq is contractors)”.³²

²⁹ General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve Logistics Augmentation Program, Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington, D.C: January 1997,14

³⁰ The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Contracting, Report to the Secretary of the Army: Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 2007 as quoted by Patrick Conway, The Battlefield Contracting Community of Practice, Army Logistician; Mar/Apr 2008, 46

³¹ Ibid, 46

³² Conway, The Battlefield Contracting Community, 47

JP 3-0 in defining Control states: “ Control allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Ultimately, it provides the commander a means to measure, report, and correct performance”.³³

Given present circumstances it is very difficult for the JF commander to integrate and synchronize the efforts of approximately 50% of his force, and even more difficult to measure, report and correct performance of the contractor force because of the dearth of contracting knowledge in his command.

Today the DOD lacks a system to measure contractor readiness, “[There is] No comprehensive system in place to measure contractors’ effects on unit readiness at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of logistical support. At present, and for the foreseeable future, contractor readiness is becoming more, not less, critical in today’s high-tempo, deployment-intensive environment”.³⁴

The JFC then, does not really know the weaknesses or strengths, other than in general terms, of the largest portion of his combat support and combat service support force, because he has not trained with them, as he has with the rest of his force.

The JF commander’s task of being the steward of government resources, an extension one could say of his control function, is complicated by his own and his staff’s lack of contracting knowledge, and under-resourcing by the DOD contracting community of personnel with expertise in contracts. The DOD also has not prepared military personnel prior to deployment to manage contracts. The GAO in a 2003 report found “ that they ,knew nothing about LOGCAP before they deployed and had received no training regarding their

³³ JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-5

³⁴ Rampy, Paradox or Paradigm? 74

roles and responsibilities'. Further, the GAO interviewed members of the logistical support units who were the primary interface with Halliburton in the field and found that these individuals had only received a two-week training session before being deployed and had little experience beyond that".³⁵

Lack of training and experience, contract regulations that do not permit the JFC to exercise C2 over the contractor force in his AOR, and the lack of unity of effort in determining the proper contractor support force in size and composition imposes a huge burden on the JFC and his staff. The GAO in 2008 testimony to Congress gave the present scope of the problem, "Although DOD estimated in its October 2007 report to Congress that 129,000 contractors support deployed forces in Iraq, no one person or organization made a decision to send 129,000 contractors to Iraq. Rather, the decision to send contractors to support forces in Iraq was made by numerous DOD activities both within and outside of Iraq".³⁶ The way ahead is clear if the DOD is to improve its contingency contracting practices and in the process alleviate the challenge the Joint Force Commander faces in commanding and controlling his contractor support force.

CONCLUSIONS

Contractors have become part of the DOD force structure, and there is no going back. The private sector provides the DOD with many efficiencies and flexibility, and allows the military to focus on their core capabilities. But as an institution the DOD has not fully realized the potential of this "third force", because at the Operational level, Commands fail to plan with and for contractors.

³⁵ Contractors on the Battlefield, NWC 3025, 14

³⁶ GAO Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittees, US Senate: Implementation of Existing Guidance and other Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future Operations, January 24, 2008, 1

The DOD and COCOMS should now start planning for the utilization of contractors, as they do for Reserves and the National Guard, training and planning together to ensure success in the battlefield.

One required enabler is to change the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). It must be modified to reflect contingency requirements, “applications of the FAR in an overseas theater can result in significant additional costs, delays in undertaking contract activities and risks to contractor personnel”.³⁷ In other words the FAR needs to be made more “contingency friendly”, giving government contract managers the flexibility to award and make changes to contracts without making them adhere to such provisions as Buy America, set asides and others clearly designed for use in a non-contingency environment.

The tools are there, the options have been examined and there are a lot of good ideas on the table, now the DOD needs to exercise leadership and vision to establish the mechanisms, which will enable the JF commander to command and control all of his forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to improve the command and control of contractors on the battlefield, ensure stewardship and unity of effort, a major restructuring of contingency contracting practices is needed. Also needed is the recognition by the DOD of the contractor force as part of the total force structure.

To deal with the oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces, the DOD created the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support), “to serve as the focal point to lead DOD’s efforts to improve contract management

³⁷ Contractors on the Battlefield, NWC 3025,16

and oversight”.³⁸ The same GAO report goes on to say that they found little evidence that the DOD components were implementing this guidance or much of the additional guidance addressing the management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces.³⁹

The DOD guidance the GAO referred to is reflected in joint doctrine for the management of contractors. JP 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters provides guidance to the commander to include contractor management when developing the JTF’s operation plan (OPLAN) or the operation order (OPORD). It also gives the commander the ability to stand up a Contracting Office to coordinate the contracting requirements of the JTF. This is not being done consistently or appropriately, perhaps because of lack of trained and experienced personnel, or recognition of the importance of the contractor force.

Recommendations for the DOD:

Design contracts with a vision of the operation(s) the COCOM and /or the JTF will be performing. This will require a bottom up approach, where the COCOM or the JTF drives the requirements for contracting; in other words the JFC designs his contractor force to meet his support requirements, much as he develops the rest of his force. The contract(s) should be “owned” by the JFC commander so that he has flexibility in utilizing them. This will also give him visibility of all contractor personnel in the Joint Operating Area (JOA) at any one time, and the “opportunity to exploit best value for the money by avoiding duplication of contracts and personnel within the JOA”.⁴⁰

In order to perform this control and stewardship function, the contracting office recommended by JP 3-33 must be established. The PARC should head it, and staffed with enough personnel to provide oversight, quality control and contract management

³⁸ GAO Testimony 24 January 2008, 5

³⁹ Ibid, 5

⁴⁰ Uttley, Contractors Deployed, 42.

commensurate with the size of the contractor being managed. For example if there is a battalion's worth of contractors there should be the equivalent of a battalion staff to manage it. This will require that the DOD grow its contracting officer force, a government skill whose numbers have eroded over time. The GAO recommends that in the "process of planning for a substantial increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps, it is important that the department address the impact this growth in military forces will have on the contractor services needed to support those forces; a portion of that increase should be dedicated to expanding and enhancing the department's professional acquisition force".⁴¹ The DOD must strengthen their contract management training at every professional military training level. Officers and NCOs in logistics specialties must receive more in depth training on contract management and contractor oversight. Deploying forces must ensure that they have sufficient school trained contract officer representatives (CORs) to manage the contractor force supporting them.

Planning for contractor support is an area that although recommended in joint doctrine, it seldom happens at the COCOM and JTF levels. The planning at the operational level must be led by the COCOM or the JTF and must include the company or companies selected to provide the contractor support for the operation. The most effective way to accomplish this is to embed a permanent contractor logistics cell with the planning cell of the COCOM, fashion similarly as the Contingency Logistics cell used by the British military. The purpose of this cell would be "to continually identify and manage actual or potential future requirements for all contractor support".⁴² There would also be a contractor logistics "Operations Team,

⁴¹ GAO testimony, 24 January 2008, 20

⁴² Uttley, Contractors Deployed, 42

responsible for specific planning and implementation of commercial support to particular operations”.⁴³

One final recommendation also based on the British model would be to partner with the commercial firms supporting the force. The British Contingency Logistics model is a “nonexclusive 7-year contract with KBR to provide advice on the employment of contractor capability and to act as a potential single source for a broad range of deployed commercial support”.⁴⁴ Since sole source contracts for large logistics contracts is anathema to DOD contracting, the same purpose could be achieved by bringing all the companies participating in LOGCAP, for example, into the planning cell. The advantage of such an arrangement is that the contractor(s) participate in planning each stage of the operation, from the “logistic estimate production to the direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery phases”.⁴⁵ The partnership will allow the COCOM to stay informed through the contractor representative of the readiness of their force, and status of their training. Moreover if the COCOM or the JF commander “owns” the contract, the arrangement will provide the JFC “with flexibility, as private sector support taskings can be added or subtracted at short notice, and the „partnership’ enables the Joint Headquarters to focus on defining its requirements, while the contractor uses its commercial expertise to focus on meeting the military needs”.⁴⁶ This arrangement should result in addressing the range of C2 concerns mentioned earlier; it would provide the JFC with the ability to “command” the contractors by having the contract instruments “in house”, rather than a continent away, giving him the flexibility to make contract changes quickly, timely and at a lesser cost.

⁴³ Ibid, 42

⁴⁴ Ibid, 43

⁴⁵ Ibid, 44

⁴⁶ Uttley, Contractors Deployed, 44

By providing him with the appropriate staff of experienced contracting personnel to evaluate and measure the performance of the contractor force will give him the tools he needs to better perform his function of stewarding government resources.

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